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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyzes the intricate relationship between courage and shame as presented in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9. To cite the most pressing example: citizen-soldiers 
endure in the face of deadly risk in the hope of gaining honor and avoiding what is “shameful” 
(1116a29). They act “on account of virtue” and “a desire for what is noble” (1116a27-29). 
Nevertheless, Aristotle insists that such citizen-soldiers, however admirable, are not truly 
courageous men. In order to understand both the distinction between, as well as the proximity 
of, shame and courage, this paper draws on Bernard Williams’s account of shame offered in his 
Shame and Necessity. 
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Describing the courageous man in NE III.7, Aristotle says that he will “fear such 
things as he should, as reason (logos) maintains and for the sake of the kalon” 
(1115b12-14).1 By contrast, in NE II.4 he says that in order for agents to qualify 
as genuinely virtuous they must “act by choosing and choosing [the virtuous 
actions] for their own sake (di’ auta)” (1105a33).  Terence Irwin thinks that 
“Aristotle takes these two descriptions of the virtuous person’s motive to be 
inseparable.”2 Although I believe his statement to be true, his reconstruction of 
Aristotle’s argument on its behalf is unsatisfying. For Irwin, the kalon, at least as 
used in the NE, is “necessarily connected to the good of others,”3 and a virtuous 
action is kalon. Hence, acting for the sake of the kalon is inseparable from acting 
for the sake of the virtuous action itself.  Part VI will argue against this view on 
the grounds that it excessively “moralizes” Aristotle’s conception of virtue.   
                                                 
1 Kalon will be left untranslated. It is typically rendered as “beautiful,” “fine” or “noble” and is 
regularly used to described that “for the sake of which” a virtuous person acts.  So, for example,  
The “liberal” person (eleutherios) “will give [money] for the sake of the kalon” (1120a24).  
Translations from the NE are my own.   
2 Terence Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” in J. Miller (ed.)  Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics:  A Criticial Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 241.  
3 Ibid., 251.   
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In order to narrow down the vast (and treacherous) terrain of the NE, this 
paper will focus only on courage as explicated in NE III.6-9.  Parts I-IV will 
analyze these chapters.  Part V will investigate another pair of closely related 
descriptions. In NE III.7 Aristotle says that the courageous man acts for the sake 
of the kalon. In NE III.8 he states that the citizen-soldier who, while similar to is 
not a genuinely courageous man, acts from a desire for the kalon.  Once again, I 
will argue that Irwin’s moralizing interpretation of the kalon will not suffice to 
explain the proximity of these phrases.  
 
 
1. NE III.6 
 
Aristotle announces that in taking up each of the “moral” (êthikê: 1103a15) 
virtues, “we should state what they are, concerning (peri) what sort of things they 
are, and how (pôs) they are” (1115a4-5). He begins with courage (andreia: 1115a6), 
defined as the “mean concerning (peri) fear and confidence” (1115a7).  Strikingly, 
however, he quickly shifts focus away from courage and toward the person who 
possesses it:  “the courageous man” (ho andreios: 1115a11).4  For reasons unstated, 
understanding the “who” seems to precede understanding the “what.”  
NE III.6 then asks, with what is the courageous man concerned? This move 
reveals an important feature of Aristotle’s treatment of the moral virtues (with, 
arguably, the exception of justice).  Understanding what a virtue is first requires 
concretization or personalization - the virtuous person must be studied - which in 
turn requires identifying the area of concern, the field or region of human life, in 
which that person activates his virtue.5  This procedure can be likened to 
cartography. Throughout his discussion of the moral virtues, Aristotle demarcates 
various regions of concern on a conceptual map of the ethical life. In these 
bounded areas the virtues, manifested in the people possessing them, will appear.6  
In this sense, his procedure can also be likened to a phenomenology of the ethical 
life.  
The region of concern in which courage appears is constituted by the two 
emotions or passions (pathê) of “fear and confidence” (phobous kai tharrê: 1115a7).  
As he explains in III.9, the former is decisive, and so Aristotle begins here by 
discussing fear and its objects. He seems to approve of the definition of fear as 
“the expectation of a bad thing” (kakou: 1115a9). This is, at least, compatible 
with his more detailed discussion in Rhetoric Book II, where he says that “fear is a 
                                                 
4 For reasons that soon should be obvious, the masculine will be used throughout this paper. It 
is meant to reflect Aristotle’s thinking, not my own.   
5 Compare NE VI.5:  “concerning practical wisdom, we could grasp it by studying (theôrêsantes) 
those whom we say have practical wisdom” (1140a24-25).  
6 The mapping of the moral virtues in NE III.6-IV.11 thus develops or fleshes out the “outline,” 
“sketch” or “diagram” (diagraphê: 1107a34) presented in NE II.7.   
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pain or disturbance that comes from the image of an imminent bad thing that 
causes destruction or pain” (1382b14) and is accompanied by “an expectation of 
experiencing a suffering that will be destructive” (1382b22). 
Human beings fear many things, including “disrepute, poverty, illness, 
friendlessness, and death” (1115a10-11), but not all of them belong in the region in 
which the appears. Aristotle must thus narrow the sprawl. Although, for example, 
a reasonable person should fear disrepute - in fact, it is,“kalon to do so, and 
aischron not to do so” (1115a12-13) - doing so does not manifest courage.   
To make the region in which courage is manifested more precise (and thus 
visible), Aristotle restricts the proper objects of the courageous man’s fear to the 
“greatest” (megista:  1115a25) of the fearful things; that is, to the worst of the bad 
things. This is death. Again, however, since most human beings fear death, and 
many comport themselves admirably in the face of it, this determination is 
inadequate. Facing death “on the sea or from disease” (1115a29), for example, 
does not qualify as a proper occasion for courage. Aristotle does not elaborate, but 
he does give a clue. He asks whether courage is only manifested in the face of “the 
most kalon” (kallistois: 1115a30) of circumstances, and then states that “such 
circumstances would be found in war, for here there is the greatest and most kalon 
of dangers” (1115a30-31). It follows, then, that “the one who is fearless (adeês) in 
the face of a kalon death could authoritatively said to be courageous” (1115a33-
34). At this stage of the analysis, Leighton thus seems quite right in saying that 
“the paradigm of courage…courage in its most perfect and noble form…is to be 
found upon the battlefield.”7 As we shall see in Part III below, however, this will 
not be Aristotle’s final say on the matter.   
Several difficulties in Aristotle’s ethical mapping of courage emerge from these 
brief remarks. Most basically, many people who are not courageous will look like 
they are.  As just mentioned, since it is kalon to fear disrepute, it is tempting to 
include the person doing so (properly) among the courageous. This, however, 
would be a mistake.  Another example, to expand (considerably) the sparse 
language Aristotle himself employs (in 1115b1-6), can be generated by imagining 
two people on a ship during a storm.  One is an experienced sailor. When the 
waves get bigger, he remains unperturbed since he knows they do not actually 
threaten the safety of the ship.  Another, however, is a passenger who has never 
sailed before.  Seeing the waves grow he “despairs of his survival and the prospect 
of such a death upsets him” (1115b2-3).  Nonetheless, he does not capitulate to his 
fear and so, like the sailor, appears “fearless” (adeês: 1115b1). To a third person 
who knows neither of the two men and can only observe their behavior, they 
appear indistinguishable even though they are, in fact, quite different. 
                                                 
7 Stephen Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions,” Phronesis 33(1988), 76.  Alessandra 
Fussi alerted me to this excellent article.  
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NE II.4 prefigured this difficulty. There Aristotle asserted that it is impossible 
to  determine whether people are virtuous simply by witnessing their actions. 
Even if an action “holds in a certain way (pôs echêi)” - that is, “is in accord with 
the virtues” (kata tas aretas) - it must be performed by an agent who “holds in a 
certain way (pôs echôn) as well” (1105a28-31).  In short, the agent must be 
virtuous if the action is to be counted as genuinely virtuous. Specifically, he must 
meet three conditions: (1) he acts “knowingly (eidôs);” (2) he “acts by choosing 
and choosing [the actions that accord with the virtues] on account of themselves 
(di’ auta);”  (3) he “holds (echôn) in a stable and unwavering manner” (1105a31-
34); that is, he reliably and consistently possesses a virtuous character trait. 
Obviously, a deep knowledge of the agent, rather than a mere observation of his 
behavior, is required in order to determine whether he meets these criteria.  
A second and related difficulty raised by Aristotle’s exploration of the 
courageous man in NE III.6 is that it seems to identify courage with fearlessness. 
Consider this passage, parts of which have already been mentioned.    
 
One should fear some things, like disrepute, and it is kalon to do so and 
aischron not to do so.  For the person fearing [disrepute] is decent and modest 
(aidêmôn), while the one not doing so is shameless (anaischuntos).  He is said 
by some to be courageous metaphorically, since he does bear some similarity 
to the courageous man.  For the courageous man is someone fearless (aphobos) 
(1115a12-16). 
   
 Aristotle’s thinking here is expressed in typically sparse language. Perhaps it 
is this:  disrepute is bad, and as such is a reasonable object to fear in a kalon 
manner.  So, for example, a decent person may assist people who are trapped in a 
fire because of his fear of what others would say about him if he failed to act, and 
it will be kalon for him to feel such fear. Entering the burning house, then, he 
appears fearless.  He is not, however, genuinely courageous. After all, he is 
motivated by fear of disrepute.  At best, he is similar to the courageous man.  
The big problem here is located in the last sentence of the passage:  the 
courageous man is said to be someone fearless, a point Aristotle reiterates later 
when he says that “the one who is fearless (adeês) in the face of a kalon death 
could authoritatively said to be courageous” (1115a33-34).8  But on Aristotelian 
terms this cannot be. After all, courage is the “mean concerning fear and 
confidence.” By definition, then, it requires some measure of fear.  
On the one hand, this problem can be eliminated by noting that NE III.6 is a 
preliminary stage of Aristotle’s analysis, and that in it he is exploring widely held 
opinions that he may not share.  Note, for instance, the optative at 1115a33:  
someone “could say” (legoit’) that the fearless man is the courageous man. 
                                                 
8 There does not appear to be a difference in the meanings of aphobos and adeês.   
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Presumably, though, he would be wrong.  For the reasons mentioned above, 
however, this is an easy mistake to make. Recall the earlier example: to an 
external observer the experienced sailor and the passenger - both of whom look 
calm and composed and behave accordingly - seem indistinguishable, even though 
one understands that the waves are not dangerous, while the other believes the 
ship will be swamped and that he will suffer an unbecoming death.  It is 
impossible to detect courage through a glance.  
NE III.6 provokes another challenge. Aristotle says courage is 
“authoritatively” instantiated only in facing a “kalon death.” Furthermore, it 
must occur in the face of “whatever may bring sudden death, and this occurs 
especially in war” (1115a33-34).  Recall Leighton’s comment that “courage in its 
most perfect and noble form…is to be found upon the battlefield.” But does it 
matter on which side the good soldier is fighting?  Can one who is fighting in a war 
that is not kalon be courageous? What about the Persian soldier who in every 
observable way appeared indistinguishable from his Athenian counterpart when 
Xerxes invaded Greece? Did he not have the opportunity to be courageous 
because his cause was unjust?  Could he not have met the three conditions 
Aristotle lists for genuine virtue in NE II.4?   
Aristotle’s mapping of this virtue in NE III.6 is not yet perspicuous. Its 
various difficulties can be encapsulated under the heading of “the recognition 
problem.” How is it possible to distinguish the courageous man from those who 
merely appear courageous?  
 
 
2. NE III.7 
 
In NE III.7 Aristotle advances beyond the preliminary reflections of NE III.6 
and seems to speak in his own voice. First and foremost, he maintains that 
courage does require the agent to feel fear.  Indeed, there are some fears that 
would require a “super-human” (huper anthropon: 1115b8) capacity not to feel and 
courage, a human virtue, cannot possibly require that. It is thus in facing normal 
fears that “the courageous man is, as a human being, imperturbable” (anekplêktos: 
1115b11).  He will “fear such things as he should, as reason (logos) maintains, and 
for the sake of the kalon” (1115b12-14). To reiterate, the underlined phrase differs 
from that required of the virtuous agent in NE II.4, where he must choose 
virtuous actions for their own sake. Before confronting this apparent discrepancy, 
another issue, also related to the recognition problem, must be addressed.   
Aristotle states that the courageous man “endures” (hupomenei: 1115b23). He 
“experiences” (paschei: 1115b20) fear, presumably in facing a kalon death, but 
does not get shaken by it. As such, he is not fearless.  But if that is so, then how 
can he be distinguished from someone who has “self-restraint?” (engkrateia: 
1145a18); someone who knows what he should do, feels a desire or passion to do 
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otherwise, but then resists that temptation? The ethical typology of NE VII.1 
makes it clear that even though the self-restrained person (the engkratês) is 
praiseworthy, he is inferior to the genuinely virtuous person.  (Analogously, the 
akratês, the person characterized by “lack of self-restraint” [akrasia], is 
blameworthy, but superior to the genuinely vicious person.) The principal 
difference between the virtuous and the self-restrained is that the former suffers 
no conflict between reason and desire or passion. As Aristotle says, for example, 
about the moderate person (ho sôphrôn), “the desiring part” (to epithumêtikon) 
“ought thus to be in harmony with (sumphônein) reason (logos)” (1119b15-16). 
This person wants to do what he should do, and in fact enjoys doing it. As a 
result, he experiences no internal struggle.  By contrast, the engkratês fights a 
battle against himself, against his pathê, and wins. He does what he thinks he 
should even though his desires sorely tempt him. 
If the courageous man is required to feel fear, and endure in the face of it, then 
how does he differ from the engkratês? Leighton is helpful in tackling this 
question. He argues that, yes, the courageous man does indeed feel fear, but he 
does so in a uniquely virtuous manner.  Most important, he does not experience it, 
or any other emotion, as a force that needs to be “whipped into line.”9 In other 
words, instead of being enemies that must be subjugated, the pathê of the virtuous 
man are potentially useful friends or allies. Describing the fear experienced by the 
courageous man, Leighton explains:  
 
What Aristotle claims for fear, then, is a mechanism sensitive to and focusing 
upon certain sorts of information, leaving persons moved to fear with very 
specific conceptions of how their surroundings relate to them. To use a 
contemporary way of speaking about this, fear identifies certain features of 
our world as salient ones. 
 
Viewed in these ways, fear is not something to be struggled with or overcome, 
but something to be sensitive to and exploited. The prospect of imminent, 
destructive or painful evils that fear embodies is particularly important to a 
creature whose ultimate aim is to live and do well. Fear on a battlefield then 
involves an awareness of the situation with which one has to deal, and does so 
in a way that allows one to prepare to deal with the situation. Feeling fear 
enables one to act courageously. 
 
On this understanding of fear, not only is there little wonder that Aristotle 
should think that the courageous fear, but also little surprise that this passion 
should help define the state as an excellence rather than a form of self-control 
                                                 
9  Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions,” 88. 
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[engkrateia]. Fear, so conceived, is not like [the engkratês’] bodily appetites 
with which one must struggle and overcome, but rather something that is of 
great assistance to the courageous, something to be sensitive to and exploited 
[…]. So understood, fear is a sign of virtue, not [engkrateia].”10   
 
To illustrate by means of an innocuous example:  when riding a bicycle on a 
busy city street, especially one that does not have dedicated bike lanes, it is useful 
to feel some measure of fear.  It is vital for the cyclist to be alert to the possibility 
of a parked car veering suddenly to the left or a car on the left abruptly turning to 
the right.  The appropriate measure of fear, just as Leighton describes, heightens 
the cyclist’s sensitivity to his surroundings and helps him identify those features 
of it that might get him killed. Strikingly, this sense of keen alertness, this bit of 
excitement, is attractive, which is why the cyclist returns to it day after day.  His 
doing so illustrates (only by analogy, since cycling is not a virtue) an Aristotelian 
principle: “what accords with virtue is pleasant, or not painful, or minimally 
painful” (1120a27). The virtuous person enjoys, or at least is not pained by, being 
virtuous. Aristotle makes the same point in stronger terms in NE I.8:  “the person 
who does not enjoy kala actions is not good (agathos).  For no one would say that 
the person who does not enjoy acting justly is just….if this is so, then actions 
according to virtue are pleasant in themselves” (kath’ hautas) (1099a17-21).  
Consider the moderate person:  he is “not pained by the absence of pleasure 
and for holding himself away (apechesthai) from it” (1118b32-33). At first blush, 
this seems odd. If, for example, the beautiful body of his neighbor’s wife becomes 
available to him, and he is attracted to her but knows adultery is wrong, how 
could “holding himself away” from his passion not be a kind of pain?  On 
Leighton’s model, it is because the passion has been integrated into the agent’s 
whole being.  Yes, the woman is attractive and so, yes, he is drawn to her.  But 
acting on this desire is inconceivable to him and so the passion he feels is, once 
again, not a wild beast that needs to be tamed, but a source of energy that can be 
successfully sublimated. While it may not be pleasurable for him to hold himself 
away from the woman’s body, it is not a struggle nor does it hurt to do so.  This 
notion will prove to be pivotal in Part VI below. 
To sum up so far: Leighton successfully differentiates, at least conceptually, 
the courageous man from the one who exhibits self-restraint.  The latter must 
struggle hard to contain the fear that is exploding in his chest.  The former feels 
fear, but instead of having to fight it, he welcomes it as an energy source. For an 
external observer, however, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 
the two. Like the experienced sailor and the passenger on the ship, they may 
appear to be identical in the face of danger.  Internally or psychologically, 
however, they are not.  In fact, we can easily imagine (today) a device that 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 91.  
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measures the physiological fluctuations that accompany fear and pleasure in a 
human body. By using it we could detect differences in the courageous man and 
the engkratês.  Even as the two appear identical on a casual glance, the latter 
would measure low on the pleasure scale, and high in fear, while the former would 
be the reverse.    
(Aristotle would support this thought experiment, since he identifies courage 
as a virtue of the “non-rational parts” (1117b22). As such, either its presence or 
absence could be accompanied by physical symptoms. So for example, someone 
fearing death “turns pale” (1128b14).)   
Unfortunately, even if Leighton provides us with significant resources to 
differentiate the courageous man and the engkratês, the recognition problem is, as 
we shall next see, far from resolved.  
 
 
3. NE III.8 
 
“Courage is this sort of thing,” Aristotle says at the outset of III.8, “but others 
(heterai) are said in five ways” (1116a15-16). He does not specify to what “others” 
he refers and so, not surprisingly, translations vary.  Bartlett and Collins attempt 
to assist the reader by supplementing the Greek: “but there are also other kinds of 
courage, spoken of in five ways.”11 This is not impossible, but it is misleading. 
Because heterai is feminine plural it could refer to “courages” (andreiai), which in 
turn could be taken as shorthand for “kinds of courage.”12 However, as will soon 
become clear, this chapter describes five kinds of people who only “seem” 
(dokousi: 1116a20) to be, or are “similar to” (hômoiôtai: 1116a27), or “appear” 
(phainontai: 1116b8) courageous, but in fact are not. This chapter, then, is not 
articulating five kinds of courage. Crisp, who also supplements the heterai, 
captures this by translating thus: “Courage, then, is something like this. But the 
name is applied to five other states of character as well.”13   
 The order in which the five “others” will be examined below differs from that 
presented by Aristotle himself. It begins with the cases that are more easily 
distinguished from courage, and concludes with the most difficult. 
1. “Those who are ignorant also appear to be courageous” (1117a22). Such 
people are oblivious to the dangerous reality that faces them and so, even if they 
                                                 
11 Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  A New Translation 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).  
12 Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  Translation, 
Introduction, and Commentary  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), follow this reasoning 
strictly when they render the phrase, “but there are also other ‘courages,’ so called.”  
13 Roger Crisp, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
Terence Irwin, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, Hackett,1985) translates the line 
as follows: “but other states, five of them, are also called bravery.”  
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seem as unperturbed as a courageous man would be, they do not feel the fear that 
is requisite in order to possess the virtue.  As Leighton puts it, such virtuous fear 
has cognitive value since it “identifies certain features of our world” - namely, 
those that immediately threaten us - “as salient,” and ignorant people fail to 
detect these.  
 2.  “Nor are men of good hope (euelpides) courageous, since they are confident 
in the face of risks because they have often been victorious over many. They are 
much like (paromoioi) the courageous because both are confident” (1117a9-12). In 
fact, however, they are “not far” (1117a23) from the ignorant; that is, they are 
unaware of salient features of their surroundings; namely, the ones that are really 
dangerous.  For this reason, they are like those who are “drunk” (1117a14).  
3. The person of “experience” (empeiria: 1116b3), such as a professional soldier 
(or the sailor on the ship mentioned in NE III.6), will also appear courageous. 
Well-versed in things military, he knows what events are actually life-threatening, 
and what are merely “false alarms” (kena: 1116b7).14 Since the latter are common, 
most of the time he will seem unafraid or imperturbable, and so he is easily 
confused with the genuinely courageous soldier. In fact, Aristotle says, such men 
typically flee when their lives are seriously at risk. For this reason they are quite 
unlike “citizen soldiers” (politika: 1116b18), who keep their post even in the face of 
likely death (and who will be discussed in 5. below.) 
4.  Men energized by “spirit” (thumos: 1116b31) are ready, even eager, to face 
real danger. Driven by anger, or the desire for revenge, or brute love of the fight, 
they enter the battle and face death with fierce joy. As such, they too will appear 
courageous. But they are not because “courageous men act on account of (dia) the 
kalon” (1116b30-31), while spirited men, driven by their “passion” (pathos: 
1117a9), act impulsively.  Nonetheless, the character described here (1116b24-
1117a9) is easy to mistake for the genuinely courageous because “the courageous 
are spirited” (thumoeideis: 1116b26). As Aristotle puts it, in them spirit “works 
together” (suergei: 1116b31) with other psychological components. This seems to 
mean that, similar to fear, this potentially lethal passion will be integrated into 
the totality of their being, specifically their “reason” (logos:1117a9). To apply 
Leighton’s terminology again, spirit will be “something to be sensitive to and 
exploited” rather than struggled against. In fact, Aristotle says that if thumos is 
supplemented by “choice and the for the sake of which” it will actually become 
“courage” (1117a4-5). Presumably the “for the sake of which” is the kalon.   
To sum up again: it now seems that the courageous man must face a kalon 
death in battle, must energetically try to kill his enemies while feeling either 
pleasure or at least no pain in doing so, and yet not be driven by rage or an 
exuberant lust for blood, but instead be guided by a deliberate choice and for the 
                                                 
14 “False alarms” is from Bartlett and Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  A New 
Translation.  
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sake of the kalon. As the final (albeit Aristotle’s first) example makes clear, such a 
person is terribly difficult to recognize.  
5. “Political” (politikê) courage - or rather the political inflection of apparent 
courage - “seems most like” (1116a17) real courage.  Citizen-soldiers “seem to 
endure” (1116a18) in the face of deadly risk on account of both the punishment 
they would suffer were they to desert their post and “the honors” (1116a19) they 
will receive should they prove heroic. The first motivation is not impressive, since 
such soldiers are “compelled” (1116a30) to fight.  The second, however, is.  As 
Aristotle puts it, those who face death in battle in the hope of gaining honor and 
avoiding what is aischron (1116a29) do so “on account of virtue (di’ aretên). For 
they do so on account of shame (aidô) and a desire (orexin) for the kalon, since 
they have a desire for honor, and in order to avoid blame, which is aischron” 
(1116a27-29).   
These lines bring the recognition problem to a head. First, both the courageous 
man and the citizen-soldier act “on account of virtue.”  Second, both their actions 
are propelled, in some fashion, by the kalon.  The courageous man acts “for the 
sake of the kalon” (1115b13) or “on account of the kalon” (1117a8), while the 
citizen-soldier has a desire for honor, which translates into a “desire for the 
kalon.” Both will appear fearless and either enjoy or at least not be pained in 
facing death.  How can they possibly be differentiated? 
 
 
4.  NE III.9 
 
This chapter begins by asserting that courage is far more concerned with fear than 
with confidence. As such, “courage is in fact painful” (1117a33).  This is odd, since 
the exercise of virtue should be pleasurable, or at least not painful, so Aristotle 
elaborates.  “The end (telos) that relates to courage would seem to be pleasant” 
(1117a35).  He illustrates with a comparison to a boxer who endures painful blows 
“for the sake of” (hou heneka: 1117b3) sweet victory.  Similarly, a courageous man 
endures death and wounds “because (hoti) it is kalon to do so and aischron not to” 
(1117b9). This phrase is similar to the description in NE III.6 (1115a12-13) of the 
“modest” (aidêmôn) person. It is kalon for him to fear disrepute and would be 
aischron for him not to.  The difference seems to be that, as stated in NE II.4, the 
courageous man “knowingly” (eidôs: 1117b13) “chooses (hairetai) what is kalon in 
war” (1117b14-15), while the person animated by aidôs, principally the citizen-
soldier, desires honor, which is kalon, and seeks to avoid disrepute.  The difference 
in these formulations is subtle, to be sure, and needs to be elaborated.    
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5. For the Sake of the Kalon v. Desire for the Kalon 
 
In NE IV.9 Aristotle presents two reasons why the agent driven by aidôs is not 
genuinely virtuous. First, aidôs “seems to be more of a pathos than a 
characteristic” (hexis: 1128b9). As stipulated in NE II.4, for an action to be 
virtuous it must be performed by an agent who “holds (echôn) in a stable and 
unwavering manner” (1105a31). Because the person energized by shame is driven 
by a pathos, and so acts impulsively, he does not qualify. This is reinforced by the 
fact that aidôs, like fear, manifests itself in physiological symptoms such as 
“blushing” (1128b13).  Second, while it is appropriate for the “young” (1128a16) 
to be moved by aidôs, it would not be suitable in an older, genuinely virtuous 
person.15  Such a person “will never voluntarily do base things” (1128b30) nor 
(unlike the engkratês) even be tempted by doing so.  Therefore, aidôs is simply not 
part of his psychological repertoire. By contrast, the young person, impelled by 
orexis for the kalon, strives to be, but has not yet actually become, a good man.  
At his age, then, the best he can do is take his bearings from what others think of 
him.  As such, shame is his appropriate motivator. When he fights as a citizen-
soldier he holds his ground even when facing the threat of imminent death because 
he fears looking bad, and hopes to look good, in the eyes of his comrades and 
elders, through which he sees himself.16  
By contrast, a mature and genuinely virtuous person no longer needs such 
external motivation. As Aristotle says in NE I.6, because honor “seems to reside 
more with those who bestow it” (1095b25) than with the agent himself it does not 
qualify as the highest good, which of course turns out to be “an activity of the 
soul in accord with virtue” (1098a17).  Furthermore, he continues, “people seem 
to pursue honor so that they may be convinced that they themselves are good” 
(1095b28). In other words, the desire for honor manifests an internal insecurity, 
which younger people are naturally prone to feel, and consequent need for 
validation.  Because the highest good must be “complete” (teleion: 1097a29) and 
“self-sufficient” (1097b7), being motivated by either the desire for honor or the 
fear of disrepute eliminates someone from the ranks of the genuinely virtuous.    
It must be remembered, however, that the mature man was once young. In his 
youth he too was guided by what others thought of him. Through experience and 
reflection he somehow outgrew this need.  He became able to see himself for what 
he is rather than needing the eyes of others.  Alternatively formulated, he 
internalized those others. This notion will be elaborated in Part VI below.  
                                                 
15 Note that shame plays an important role in the educational scheme Aristotle sketches in X.9.  
A young person is habituated so that he regularly “feels pleased by (stergon) the kalon and 
displeased by the aischron” (1179b30).  
16 My colleague, the ancient historian Loren J. Samons, tells me that although Athenians were 
liable for service into their 50s, and the average age of the Athenian soldier is unknown, it is 
likely that most were rather young; that is, between twenty and thirty-five.  
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Aristotle now seems to have mustered the conceptual resources needed to 
distinguish between the apparently courageous citizen-soldier and the genuinely 
courageous man, and not simply on the basis of age differences. The former, 
driven by aidôs, acts from a desire for the kalon, understood as some sort of public 
visibility and affirmation, and the latter for the sake of the kalon 
understood…understood as what?  
This is a problem since, as many commentators have noted, “Aristotle never 
explains in the NE what to kalon is.”17 Furthermore, as Irwin notes, throughout 
the corpus in different contexts it clearly refers to different properties. He cites as 
examples things that are “pleasant through sight and hearing,” those that exhibit 
“teleological order” or “symmetry, definiteness and greatness,” and those that are 
“appropriate and admirable.”18 But he also argues that there is “one recurrent 
point” when the word is used in the context of ethics:  something kalon is 
“admirable insofar as it extends to the common good.”19 He reformulates: there is 
“good reason to believe that the property [Aristotle] picks out in moral contexts 
through his use of ‘kalon’ is moral rightness,”20 understood as acting for the good 
of others.  
On Irwin’s view, then, the genuinely courageous soldier who endures in war 
would be driven by a non-selfish imperative, which could be formulated roughly 
as follows: ‘I must stay at my post and risk my life because doing so will benefit 
others and as such is morally right.’ Another clause can be added in order to 
distinguish it from the imperative that would guide the citizen-soldier: ‘Even 
though honor is kalon, whether I am recognized for my actions or not is irrelevant 
to me.’  
There is textual support for Irwin’s thesis. In the Rhetoric, for example, 
Aristotle states “those actions are kala that a man does not for the sake of himself. 
Actions that are simply good (agatha) are ones that someone does for the sake of 
his city, while neglecting his own interest” (to hautou)” (1366b35-67a5). 
Nonetheless, Irwin’s account is unsatisfying for at least two reasons. Crisp 
marshals one. Simply stated, “the virtuous person’s only object of concern is his 
own happiness,” not the well being of others.  This is true even if the agent does 
care about the well being of others, and acts (virtuously) on their behalf. As Crisp 
puts it, the Aristotelian agent “may be moved by a genuine non-instrumental 
concern for the good of a friend. But he knows that action on such concern is part 
of what constitutes the best life for him.”21 If Crisp is right - and whether he is or 
not is obviously a complicated question - then Irwin is wrong in his interpretation 
                                                 
17 Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine,” in Richard Kraut (ed.) 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Ethics  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 118.  
18 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 241.  
19 Ibid., 243. 
20 Ibid., 241. 
21 Roger Crisp, “Nobility in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis 59(2014), 241.  
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of what it means to act “for the sake of the kalon.” The phrase would not signal 
moral rightness understood as acting essentially for the benefit of others.    
Irwin’s account is problematic for other reasons, which come to light in 
returning to the genuinely courageous man (or soldier) of NE III.6-9, the one who 
acts for the sake of the kalon.  On Irwin’s view this person is willing to risk death 
on the battlefield for a moral reason; that is, the good of others. Since Aristotle 
explicitly contrasts him with the citizen-soldier who is prompted by desire for 
honor or fear of disrepute, he is unconcerned with what those others will think of 
him. He wants to benefit them but does not need to be noticed by them.  He is 
willing to act even if his agency becomes invisible. This, however, violates a 
primary feature of  “kalon.” As Lear puts it, “visibility or ‘showiness’ is essential 
to” Aristotle’s conception of the kalon, which is why she translates it as “fine.”22 If 
she is right, then by moralizing “for the sake of the kalon” Irwin strips it of its 
connection to visibility. In other words, he too sharply distinguishes “kalon” from 
“beautiful.”  
To elaborate: Aristotle says that “political courage” as embodied in the 
citizen-soldier “seems most like” real courage. But if Irwin were right, then the 
two would in fact be fundamentally different. The genuinely courageous man, on 
his view, is guided by a moral imperative and is animated by concern for others, 
while the citizen soldier is animated by aidôs and therefore a kind of self-concern. 
He desires the kalon for himself, and so seeks honor and avoids disrepute. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle states that even the young soldier acts “on account of 
virtue.” Now, with this phrase he may be referring to an immature version of 
virtue, but his use of the word suggests that far from being fundamentally 
different as Irwin’s account would imply, there is continuity between the young 
self-regarding soldier and the mature virtuous man.  
Furthermore, recall that the mature man was animated by, even educated by, 
aidôs when he was young. But if Irwin were correct that acting “for the sake of 
the kalon” means acting for what is morally right and the betterment of others, 
then a youth spent driven by aidôs would not prepare someone for a morally 
virtuous life. Instead, a youth spent in the army, surrounded by (mostly young) 
fellow soldiers who aspire to glory, who take their bearings from what others think 
of them, would prepare him to become supremely self-concerned. A genuinely 
“moral” education would somehow inculcate selflessness in the agent, not a desire 
for honor. On Irwin’s moralizing interpretation of the phrase “for the sake of the 
kalon” a mature (virtuous) person should repudiate his own youth, for he would 
see himself then as having been far too oriented to others. By contrast, Aristotle 
states that it is “fitting” (harmozei: 1128b16) for a young person to feel, and for an 
older person to have felt, aidôs.  The mature man should thus appreciate, even 
admire, who he was. After all, even back then he acted “on account of virtue” and 
                                                 
22 Lear, “On Moral Virtue and the Fine,” 122. 
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on a desire for what is kalon.  
A quick rebuttal is available to Irwin here.  He could follow Korsgaard in 
arguing that a young soldier’s desire to look good in the eyes of his comrades and 
superiors - that is, his desire for the kalon in the form of honor - prepares him for 
true virtue insofar as it makes him “receptive to the more mature state of 
autonomy.”23 This is just one element in her argument that Aristotle and Kant, 
the moralist par excellence, are actually closer than is usually thought.  As she puts 
it, both “think that what gives an action more value is the fact that it is chosen 
for its intrinsic rightness.”24 Furthermore, she quotes Kant in saying that “the 
love of honor is ‘the constant companion of virtue’” and thereby helps teach a 
young person to act morally; that is, unselfishly. She does not explain how this 
educational process would work.  In any case, by her lights, “Kant and Aristotle 
need have no disagreement about this kind of case [aiming for honor] at all.”25  
While this line of thought is plausible, it does not adequately address the 
startling proximity into which Aristotle brings the citizen solider and the 
genuinely virtuous man. The former acts from a desire for the kalon while the 
latter for the sake of the kalon. If, as Irwin has it, the property to which Aristotle 
refers in using “kalon” in the ethical works is “moral rightness,” then both would 
be acting for the sake of others. But this is manifestly untrue of the (young) 
citizen soldier who is driven by aidôs and the self-regarding desire for honor.  
Another account of how the kalon enters the life of the virtuous is needed. 
 
 
6. For the Sake of the Kalon and For the Sake of the Virtuous Actions Themselves  
 
Recall that Irwin claims that acting “for the sake of the kalon” (NE III.7) and 
“choosing [the actions that accord with the virtues] on account of themselves (di’ 
auta)” (NE II.4) are “inseparable.” As he puts it, “to say that it is kalon” - which 
for him means morally right and for the benefit of others - “is simply to say that it 
is to be chosen for its own sake.”26 The two formulations are inseparable indeed, 
but not because both share a similarly moralized conception of the kalon.  To 
explain, consider the following hypothesis.   
The genuinely courageous man, the one who acts both for the sake of the kalon 
and on account of the virtuous actions themselves, is guided by the following sort 
of imperative: ‘I must stay at my post because that is what I do; that is who I am. 
Not to do so would be to fracture or betray myself, and as such would be 
                                                 
23 Christine Korsgaard, “From Duty and For the Sake of the Noble:  Kant and Aristotle on 
Morally Good Action,” in Engstrom S. and Whiting, J. (ed.) Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: 
Rethinking Happiness and Duty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 220.  
24 Ibid., 205. 
25 Ibid., 220. 
26 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 248. 
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aischron.’ In this formulation, aischron will come closer to “ugly,” and kalon to 
“beautiful” than Irwin would allow.  For the genuinely courageous soldier acts for 
the sake of maintaining himself, of presenting himself to himself as a coherent, 
well ordered being; one who is kalon.  Hence, he acts for the sake of the kalon.  He 
acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves insofar as he does not look 
beyond them to consequences or for any reason other than their worthiness; that 
is, they are kala.  
This hypothesis helps account for the proximity between the citizen-soldier 
who is driven by aidôs and so is self-regarding (and who is the younger self of the 
mature man), and the genuinely courageous man.  The kalon figures prominently 
in the souls of both. In order to clarify how it does so, a deeper understanding of 
aidôs is needed. For this I turn briefly to Bernard Williams’s well-known 
discussion of shame.  
Williams argues against the “progressivist” view that the Greeks, specifically 
Homer and the tragedians, whose characters are indeed often driven by aidôs, 
lacked a sophisticated concept of ethical responsibility.27 Thinking this results 
from the pernicious identification of the ethical with the “moral.” For the 
moralist, “I am provided by reason, or perhaps by religions illumination… with a 
knowledge of the moral law, and I need only the will to obey it.”28 While a shame-
based system is not that, neither is it shallow or crudely heteronomous. 
Consider what Williams has to say about Sophocles’ Ajax.  Having been 
tricked by Athena into thinking that the animals in the pen are actually the 
leaders of the Greek forces who have humiliated him, he slaughters them.  When 
his madness subsides and he realizes he is surrounded by the bloody entrails of 
dead sheep, he feels an overwhelming sense of shame. He can no longer live with 
himself and so resolves to commit suicide.  He expresses his conviction in the form 
of an imperative: “now I am going where my way must go.” This is not a moral 
imperative but nonetheless, according to Williams, it is categorical.  As he puts it, 
Ajax’s words mean “that he must go: period.”29  
From a Kantian or moral perspective, Ajax’s imperative does not deserve to 
be counted as categorical. On this view, it is merely hypothetical in that it 
represents an action chosen “relative merely to what the agent wants to do….or 
to avoid what he fears.” Even worse, it takes it bearings from what others will say 
of the action, and as such is ethically shallow and bound by convention.  Williams 
disagrees. While it is true that shame is fundamentally related to being seen, it is 
not true that this makes an aidôs-driven action superficial or crudely 
heteronomous. As he puts it, even if shame does require an other, that “other may 
be identified in ethical terms.  He…is conceived as one whose reactions I would 
                                                 
27 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity.  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 64. 
28 Ibid., 95. 
29 Ibid., 76. 
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respect.”30 In this, its most developed form, where it no longer is dependent on an 
actual audience (and therefore on mere convention), shame incorporates an 
internalised other capable of holding an “inner personal conviction.”31 And this 
makes possible the sort of categorical imperative, or necessity, that drives Ajax.  
As Williams puts it, 
 
This sense of necessity lies in the thought that one could not live and look 
others in the eyes if one did certain things:  a thought which may be to 
varying degrees figurative but can also be in a deadly sense literal, as it was 
with Ajax. These necessities are internal, grounded in the êthos, the projects, 
the individual nature of the agent, and in the way he conceives the relation of 
his life to other people’s.32   
 
For Williams, as for Aristotle, the person animated by shame can grow.  
 
Shame looks to what I am.  It can be occasioned by many things - actions…or 
thoughts or desires or the reactions of others.  Even where it is certainly 
concerned with an action, it may be a matter of discovery to the agent, and a 
difficult discovery, what the source of the shame is, whether it is to be found in 
the intention, the action, or an outcome. Someone might feel shame at the 
letter he has mailed because it is …a petty and stupid response to a trivial 
slight; and the shame is lightened, but only to some degree, when it turns out 
that the letter was never delivered. Just because shame can be obscure in this 
kind of way, we can fruitfully work to make it more perspicuous, and to 
understand how a certain action or thought stands to ourselves, to what we 
are and to what realistically we can want ourselves to be.33  
 
Williams’s aidôs-driven agent advances beyond shame understood as seeing 
himself through the eyes of others and toward shame as seeing himself through an 
internalized other who holds ethical convictions he himself embraces.  His agency 
deepens and he becomes more self-sufficient. The agent must act the way he does 
because that is who he is. As Williams so sharply puts it, “shame looks to what I 
am.” 
Following Williams on shame helps explain why, according to Aristotle, aidôs 
is preparatory for a life of genuine virtue. To return to my hypothesis:  as a youth, 
the genuinely courageous man was driven by aidôs and the desire for recognition 
by his comrades and elders.  As he developed, he internalized these others. He 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Ibid., 95. 
32 Ibid., 103 
33 Ibid., 93. 
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came to think for himself.  But he never lost his desire for the visibility of the 
kalon. In acting on account of virtuous actions themselves, he seeks this visibility 
in the form of a self-image or representation. In short, the virtuous person is 
prompted to act by the desire to see himself as kalon.  
To clarify this interpretation of Aristotle, which I am not attributing to 
Williams, consider Lear’s argument concerning the relationship between moral 
virtue and “the fine.”  Pace Irwin, who is adamant that Aristotle’s “use of [kalon] 
does not express a conviction about morality and beauty,”34 Lear thinks Aristotle 
has “good reason to make beauty central to his account of virtue.”35 For her, the 
key ingredients of the kalon are  “effective teleological order, visibility and 
pleasantness.”36 The latter two items are particularly important here. As she says, 
“the experience of one’s actions as beautiful is, we might say, the mode of the 
virtuous person’s apprehension of their goodness.”37 In turn, this apprehension is 
the source of the pleasure that Aristotle stipulates that the virtuous person must 
feel.  As Lear puts it, “acting well is a proper source of self-regarding pleasure.”38 
It is a pleasure that comes from apprehending oneself, not simply as someone who 
acts to benefit others (although of course one may do so), but as kalon…as 
beautiful to behold.      
To suggest reasons why Lear may be right here, consider the following three 
passages from the NE.   
1. In NE III.4, Aristotle asks whether the object of “wish” (boulêsis) is the 
good or “what appears to be good.”  If it is the former, then the wish of someone 
who “chooses incorrectly” - that is, pursues a bad end - in fact does not have an 
object and so is no real wish at all.  If it is the latter, then a pernicious relativism 
sets in: whatever “seems so to individual” would have to be counted as good. 
Aristotle resolves this dilemma by stating that “to the ethically serious person 
(spoudaios) the object of wish is what is truly [good], while to the base person it is 
whatever happens [to appear good]…for the ethically serious person judges each 
situation correctly, and in each of them what is true appears to him.”   
On the one hand, Aristotle’s reasoning here may seem uninformative or even 
circular.  The true good is what appears to be good to the virtuous person, who in 
turn is identified by having the capacity to discern the true good.  But this offers 
no independent specification of what the true good is, and so provides no 
guidance. On the other hand, Aristotle’s reasoning here is illuminating, at least 
given his own standards of philosophical adequacy in the NE, whose project (as 
argued in Part I) is a kind of phenomenological mapping of the ethical life.  While 
it does not disclose criteria of the true good, it does tell much about the character 
                                                 
34 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 253. 
35 Lear, “On Moral Virtue and the Fine,” 117. 
36 Ibid., 117. 
37 Ibid., 117. 
38 Ibid., 128. 
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of virtuous agency.  Simply put, the virtuous person can trust himself.  He can 
rely on himself to determine what is good. He is supremely confident and needs 
only look to himself in order to determine in what direction he should go.  
The above is compatible with the hypothesis offered earlier:  the courageous 
man acting for the sake of the kalon is driven by his sense of himself as a kalon 
being who strives to be, first and foremost, himself.  He acts on account of 
virtuous actions themselves because he issues to himself the categorical 
imperatives governing them:  “this I must do: period. For this is who I am.  Not 
to do so would be aischron; ugly, ill-becoming, ill-fitting. It would be a betrayal of 
myself.”  
2.  My hypothesis is supported by the results of Part II above. There the 
virtuous agent was distinguished from the engkratês.  The latter struggles against 
his passions or desires, and is finally victorious.  The former experiences no 
internal conflict and is instead a harmonious being.  As Aristotle says, the 
knowledge of what good actions are “has grown into him” (sumphuênai: 1147a22) 
such that he is a fully integrated and harmonious being.  
In this context, Williams’s characterization of the Kantian-moral view 
provides a useful contrast: “what I am, so far as it affects the moral, is already 
given, and there is only the matter of discerning among temptations and 
distractions what I ought to do.”39 In other words, on the Kantian view engkrateia 
is the highest moral achievement.  Fighting temptation simply is the moral life. 
By contrast, for Aristotle, while fighting temptation (and winning) is admirable, it 
pales in comparison to true virtue.  For this is a kind of wholeness. The virtuous 
agent acts for the sake of the kalon. He acts for the sake of maintaining and 
presenting to himself his wholeness, which is kalon.   
3. In NE II.4 Aristotle states the virtuous agent “acts by choosing and 
choosing [the actions] on account of themselves (di’ auta).”  But it is important to 
note that this is only the second of the three requirements for virtuous agency. 
The first is that the agent acts “knowingly (eidôs),” the third is that he acts from a 
“stable and unwavering manner” character trait.  All three relate to the kind of 
person he is. He is a unified being who trusts in his own judgment and as such 
confidently engages in certain actions simply because he thinks they must be 
done. Hence, the self-generated imperative of the genuinely courageous soldier is, 
‘I must stay at my post: period. That is what I do. That is who I am. Not to do so 
would be aischron, which I am not.’ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 95. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The complications of the NE are legion. Indeed, sometimes the book feels like a 
vast and churning sea, in which a reader, at least one attempting to make sense of 
it as a whole, will surely drown. A sterling example of this is the problem, raised 
by Crisp and Irwin (and many others), of how to reconcile Aristotle’s conviction 
that happiness is the ultimate human good, which implies that self-concern drives 
the ethical life, with his discussion of the virtues, at least some of which are other-
oriented. This paper makes no pretense at a comprehensive reading of the NE or a 
solution of this problem. It does, however, suggest, that trying to determine and 
distinguish the meaning of three of Aristotle’s descriptions will be useful in the 
attempt to do so.  
1.  The courageous man acts for the sake of the kalon. 
2. The virtuous person acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves. 
3.  The person driven by aidôs and a desire for the kalon in the form of honor is 
most similar to the courageous man.  
As Irwin says, the first two are inseparable.  They are not identical. An agent 
acts for the sake of the kalon insofar as he insists on maintaining his identity and 
sense of self as kalon.  He acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves 
insofar as he is driven by categorical imperatives.  He must remain at his post 
even if his life is at risk: period.  Not to do would destroy himself.  When he was a 
younger soldier he also remained at his post, but he did so because he would have 
been ashamed to do otherwise.  As a mature man he no longer feels this way.  But 
he is still driven by the kalon, with its essential feature of visibility, even if he 
fundamentally concerned with how he appears to himself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
